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‒ How can/should SOCOM counter non-state actor chemical and biological 
weapons production?
• Background:
‒ UCP Designated USSOCOM as USG CWMD Global Synchronizer
‒ Lack of coherent threat assessment mechanism (aggressive state  nuclear 
program vs. violent extremist organization seeking chemical weapons)
‒ Finite SOCOM resources to address multiple strategically vital mission 
sets: CT, CWMD, SFA, FID, etc. 
• Way to deal with this question:
‒ Defeat models are not sufficient to address or understand this complex 
environment
‒ Decision making tools are required that enable leaders to flex 
responses/actions to appropriately balance the political and military 
circumstances
STEALING THUNDER:
Framework for USSOCOM to Counter NSA 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Production 
Results
• NSA chem/bio production should not be SOCOM’s 
priority threat until intelligence indicates that an 
attack is imminent 
• The optimal strategy for SOCOM is to delay and 
degrade chem/bio facilitation and production
• Defeat (removal of NSA intent for chem/bio 
production) can only be achieved when NSA no 
longer believed chem/bio weapons will be 
strategically useful or possible
The “So What” Next Steps
• How can future researchers build on your work?
‒ How will emerging technology change future NSA chem/bio 
production capabilities and timelines
‒ How can SOCOM best counter NSA chem/bio production within 
other nation’s borders 
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Research design
• Main hypothesis:
‒ A chem/bio production framework based on design 
thinking will be more useful to SOCOM decision 
making and CWMD efforts than specific WMD 
pathway or supply chain models  
• Method/approach: 
‒ Historical case studies (Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS)
‒ Stanford Design Thinking application to Non-State 
Actor Chem/Bio framework
‒ Nodal Analysis of chem/bio production framework
‒ SOCOM strategic implications analysis
• Two “levers” for decision making and strategy based on 
political/strategic environment
‒ Throttle action upstream to target critical nodes and 
delay/degrade chem/bio production
‒ Throttle action/resources back until later phase of production 
Stanford Design Thinking Process translated into NSA Chem/Bio 
Development Framework













Detailed NSA Chem/Bio production nodes
USSOCOM interaction zones with NSA 
Chem/Bio production
